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1Auditing for Distributed Storage Systems
Anh Le, Member, IEEE Athina Markopoulou, Senior Member, IEEE
and Alexandros G. Dimakis, Member, IEEE
Abstract
Distributed storage codes have recently received a lot of attention in the community. Independently,
another body of work has proposed integrity checking schemes for cloud storage, none of which,
however, is customized for coding-based storage or can efficiently support repair. In this work, we
bridge the gap between these two currently disconnected bodies of work. We propose NC-Audit, a
novel cryptography-based remote data integrity checking scheme, designed specifically for network
coding-based distributed storage systems. NC-Audit combines, for the first time, the following desired
properties: (i) efficient checking of data integrity, (ii) efficient support for repairing failed nodes, and (iii)
protection against information leakage when checking is performed by a third party. The key ingredient
of the design of NC-Audit is a novel combination of SpaceMac, a homomorphic message authentication
code (MAC) scheme for network coding, and NCrypt, a novel chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) secure
encryption scheme that preserves the correctness of SpaceMac. Our evaluation of NC-Audit based on
a real Java implementation shows that the proposed scheme has significantly lower overhead compared
to the state-of-the-art schemes for both auditing and repairing of failed nodes.
Index Terms
Network Coding, Distributed Storage, Auditing, Integrity, Encryption, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional distributed storage architectures provide reliability through block replication, whose
major disadvantage is the large storage overhead. As the amount of stored data is growing faster
than hardware infrastructure, this becomes a major cost bottleneck. In contrast, coding techniques
achieve higher data reliability with considerably smaller storage overhead [1]. For that reason,
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Fig. 1. Repairing a failed node [6]: The original data consists of four blocks: b1,b2,b3 and b4. A (4, 2) MDS code is used
such that any 2 nodes can be used to restore the original data. Note that the repair involves combining blocks b3 and b4 and
the repair bandwidth consists of 3 blocks instead of 4, where 4 is the amount of blocks needed to reconstruct the whole data.
coding techniques are under investigation for different distributed storage systems. Specifically,
novel storage codes are currently being deployed in production cloud storage systems, such as
Windows Azure [2], analytics clusters (e.g., Facebook Analytics Hadoop clusters [3]), archival
storage systems, and peer-to-peer storage systems like Cleversafe and Wuala [4], [5].
Distributed storage codes operate by splitting files into blocks and creating additional parity
blocks that provide fault tolerance. If the original file consists of K blocks, an (N,K) maximum
distance separable (MDS) code is typically used to produce N blocks to be stored individually
on N storage nodes, thus tolerating up to (N − K) node failures. A well-known problem of
classical erasure codes, like Reed-Solomon, is the so-called repair problem: when a single node
fails, typically one block is lost from the file; however, the reconstruction of that single block
requires reading and transferring K blocks from other nodes.
Novel storage codes that use network coding (NC) were recently developed to reduce this
repair bandwidth. These distributed storage codes require significantly less than K blocks to
repair a single node failure and rely on network coding to perform in-network processing [6],
[7]. Key ingredients of NC-based distributed storage codes include (i) storing coded blocks, i.e.,
linear combinations of original blocks that form the original data, and (ii) block mixing when
repairing. An example is shown in Fig. 1. The repair bandwidth, however, is only one aspect of
cloud storage.
Another practical aspect of cloud storage, besides the repair bandwidth, is data integrity
checking. Integrity checking is extremely important for distributed storage systems, especially
3when data is stored with untrusted cloud providers. Data can be lost or corrupted for various
reasons while users may remain completely unaware of for long periods of time. For example,
storage errors, such as torn writes [8] and latent errors [9], may damage data in a way that remains
undetected. Cloud storage providers may also have incentives to misbehave, e.g., misreport data
loss incidents in order to maintain their reputation [10]–[12]. This problem is further exacerbated
in systems that use coding because corrupted data can propagate to multiple nodes during repair
re-encoding [13]. Therefore, it is important for the user to be able to audit the integrity of the
data stored on the cloud.
Another complication is that frequent integrity checking of large data sets may be out of the
ability or budget of users with limited resources [12], [14]. As a result, users often resort to a third
party to perform audits on their behalf [10], [12], [15], [16]. In this latter case, it is important
that the auditing protocols are privacy-preserving, i.e., do not leak information to the third party
[12], [17]. Indeed, users can leverage data encryption to protect their data before outsourcing it
[16]. However, data encryption should be complementary and orthogonal to integrity checking
protocols. In other words, the auditing protocol should not introduce new vulnerabilities of
unauthorized data leakage. Furthermore, the users may want to outsource unencrypted instead
of encrypted data to support more efficient and complex computations.
As a result, auditing for distributed systems that use modern NC-based storage codes is
an important emerging problem. Despite the rich literature on auditing protocols for general
distributed and cloud storage [10]–[12], [15]–[20], [22]–[25], there have been very few auditing
protocols for NC-based distributed storage systems [13], [26]. These protocols, however, are
generic in the sense that they do not specifically exploit coding properties for efficient integrity
checking [13]. Moreover, they do not prevent data leakage [13], [26]. Most importantly, they do
not efficiently support repair, which is the main advantage of NC-based storage systems when
compared to other storage systems.
In this work, we propose a symmetric key-based cryptographic protocol, called NC-Audit, to
check for the integrity of data stored on an NC-based distributed storage system. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first scheme proposed for NC-based systems that possesses all the
following desired properties:
(i) Efficient Integrity Checking: The integrity check incurs a small bandwidth and compu-
tational overhead (on the order of milliseconds). It guarantees that, with high probability,
4the storage provider passes the integrity check if and only if it possesses the data. The
proposed protocol also supports unlimited number of checks.
(ii) Efficient Support for Repair: The repair of failed nodes require negligible bandwidth (no
data download) as well as computation for maintaining the metadata used by the integrity
checking.
(iii) Efficient Privacy Protection: A third party auditor cannot learn any information about
the user data through the checking protocol (except for the metadata used by the integrity
checking). This privacy preserving property incurs a small bandwidth (< 1%) and compu-
tational overhead (on the order of milliseconds).
We would like to emphasize that, independently of (iii), properties (i) and (ii) together are
already useful to users who could and prefer to audit the data themselves. NC-Audit is the
first protocol that possesses (i) and (ii) at the same time. NC-Audit achieves these properties
by fully exploiting network coding in its design. The main novelty of NC-Audit come from a
careful combination of SpaceMac – a homomorphic message authentication code (MAC) that
was previously specifically designed for network coding [27], [28], and NCrypt – a novel chosen-
plaintext attack (CPA) secure encryption scheme that we custom designed, in this work, to operate
in synergy with and preserve the correctness of SpaceMac.
We implemented NC-Audit in Java, utilizing our previous implementation of SpaceMac [28].
Our evaluation of NC-Audit shows that it has very low computational overhead. In particular,
when performing an audit, both the storage node and the auditor only need to spend a few
milliseconds. Furthermore, the auditor’s overhead is much less than that of the state-of-the-art
approach for NC-based storage systems [13], which is on the order of seconds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss related work. In Section
III, we formulate the problem and describe the threat model. In Section IV, we describe the
auditing framework and the key building blocks of NC-Audit, namely SpaceMac and NCrypt,
before presenting NC-Audit itself. In Section V, we show how NC-Audit efficiently supports
repair. In Section VI, we analyze the security of NC-Audit. In Section VII, we evaluate its
storage, bandwidth, and computational efficiency. In Section VIII, we conclude the paper.
5II. RELATED WORK
A. Integrity Checking for Remote Data
There has been a rich body of work on integrity checking for remote data [10]–[12], [15]–[19],
[22]–[25], commonly known as Proof of Retrievability and Proof of Data Possession.
Proof of Retrievability (POR). In [16], Juels and Kaliski introduced the notion of POR, where
a POR enables a client (verifier) to determine that the server (prover) possesses a file or data
object. Furthermore, a successful execution of POR would allow a verifier to extract the file
from the proof. The main POR scheme presented there uses sentinels, i.e., small check blocks,
that are inserted into the outsourced data to guard against large file corruption. At the same time,
it also utilizes error correcting codes to protect against small file corruption. This scheme can
only handle a limited number of queries, which has to be fixed a priori. In contrast, NC-Audit
does not use sentinels and supports unlimited number of queries.
In [15], Shacham and Waters proposed two POR schemes with full proofs of security and
extract-ability. The first one, built on Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signatures, provides public
verifiability. The second one, built on pseudorandom functions (PRFs), provides private verifia-
bility. Recently, Bowers et al. [20] proposed HAIL, an improvement of existing POR schemes
that allows for performing data integrity checking with multiple servers against stronger, mobile
adversaries.
These schemes [15], [20] exploit homomorphic properties to aggregate authenticator values
to improve the audit efficiency. NC-Audit also exploits homomorphic properties (of SpaceMac)
and provides private verifiability. In terms of extract-ability, NC-Audit is different from existing
approaches, e.g., [15], in that NC-Audit exploits the inherent embedded coding coefficients in
the stored blocks to perform the extraction. Meanwhile, [15] relies on additional erasure codes
(pre-applied to the data) for the extraction.
Proof of Data Possession (PDP). The notion of PDP was introduced by Ateniese et al. [10].
The PDP scheme in [10] uses homomorphic RSA signatures to generate verification tags. The
data possession guarantee provided by this scheme is under the RSA and KEA1 assumptions
in the random oracle model. Earlier in [29], Schwarz and Miller proposed using a combination
of both erasure-correcting coding and algebraic signatures (homomorphic hashes) to perform
6integrity checking for remote data. As discussed in [15], the notion of PDP is considered to be
weaker than POR. This is because in POR, a successful audit guarantees that all the data can
be extracted while in PDP, only a certain percentage of the data (e.g., 90%) is guaranteed to be
available. Integrity checking for groups with efficient user revocation was recently introduced
in [21]. We will show that NC-Audit provides the stronger data possession checking with data
extraction as in POR (Section VI-A).
Data Modification. In [18], Ateniese et al. proposed a symmetric-key based checking scheme
that supports data modification. This scheme is built on regular PRFs, hash functions, and
encryptions. It provides private verifiability and supports a limited number of queries. In [22],
Erway et al. proposed an auditing scheme built on rank-based authenticated skip lists and requires
the storage server to maintain the lists for verification. In [23], Wang et al. proposed a public
auditing scheme that uses a combination of the BLS-based scheme in [15] and Merkle Hash
Tree (MHT).
In practice, most current deployments of distributed storage codes [2], [3] initially set all
files to replication mode. When certain files become cold (i.e., rarely accessed and modified)
the replicated blocks are deleted and corresponding parity blocks are created. This dynamic
switching of files from replication to coding allows distributed storage systems to benefit from
the high performance of replication for hot files and the storage benefits of coding for cold files.
Interestingly, in most analytics clusters and cloud storage systems, the vast majority of data seem
to be cold [2], [3]. Therefore, we do not expect data modification to be a critical operation for
encoded data. NC-Audit provides some preliminary support for data modification, and the details
can be found in the Appendix.
Privacy Preserving. In [11], Shah et al. proposed an auditing protocol that is privacy preserv-
ing. This protocol first encrypts the data and then sends a number of message authentication
code (MAC) tags of the encrypted data to the auditor. The auditor verifies both the outsourced
data and the outsourced encryption key. This approach only works on encrypted files. It also
requires the auditor to maintain states and supports only limited number of audits. In [17],
Wang et al. proposed a privacy preserving auditing protocol that has public verifiability. This
protocol can be considered an extension of the BLS-based protocol in [15]. In this approach, the
aggregated (proving) block sent by the storage server is masked with a random element to protect
7the privacy of the block. NC-Audit is explicitly designed to provide privacy preserving-auditing
(Section IV-E and VI-B). Different from [17], NC-Audit relies on symmetric-key cryptographic
primitives instead of public-key ones, and thus it provides private instead of public auditing.
Finally, we stress that none of the schemes described above was customized for NC-based
storage. In particular, they do not provide efficient support for node repair. NC-Audit was designed
to achieve all the above properties: providing proof of retrievability and privacy-preserving
auditing while efficiently supporting node repair.
B. Integrity Checking for NC-based Storage Systems
NC-based Storage Systems. The benefits of network coding for distributed storage were first
formalized by the work of Dimakis et al. [7]. In particular, in [7], the authors proposed the
notion of regenerating codes and show that they can significantly reduce the repair bandwidth.
This work showed the fundamental tradeoff between node storage and repair bandwidth and
proposed regenerating codes that can achieve any point on the optimal tradeoff curve. A survey
on recent advances in NC-based storage system can be found at [6]. A wiki on NC-based storage
cloud is maintained at [31]. NC-Audit is designed to fully support regenerating codes.
An NC-based distributed file system (NCFS) is proposed in [32]. One of the first imple-
mentations of NC-based storage cloud is NCCloud by Hu et al. [33]. In particular, NCCloud
is a proxy-based system for multiple-cloud storage. It utilizes a functional minimum-storage
regenerating code to provide cost-effective repair for a permanent single-cloud failure. This
efficient repair is achieved without the cost of storage or redundancy level. NCCloud prototype
was deployed on top of Windows Azure Storage.
Integrity Checking Schemes for NC-Based Storage Systems. There have been only a few
number of work that provide remote data checking for NC-based storage. In [26], Dikialotis et
al. proposed an integrity checking scheme that utilizes the error-correction capabilities of the
storage system. This scheme aims to detect errors with a very small amount of bandwidth. The
key technique for reducing the bandwidth is to project data blocks onto a small random vector.
This checking scheme is inherently different from NC-Audit as it relies on the communication
between the auditor and multiple nodes to perform a single check while NC-Audit does not.
Moreover, this scheme is information-theory based while NC-Audit leverages cryptographic
8primitives to provide the checking.
A more recent integrity checking scheme for NC-based storage was proposed in [13]. In this
work, Chen et al. adopted the symmetric-key based scheme that Shacham and Waters proposed
for regular cloud storage [15] with minor modification. In particular, based on the symmetric-
key based scheme in [15], the scheme in [13] proposed to encrypt the coding coefficients of
the outsourced encoded blocks to prevent replay attacks, where a malicious storage node may
store old (incorrect) encoded blocks instead of the new (correct) encoded blocks as required by
the repair [13]. NC-Audit overcomes this attack by requiring the user/auditor to store the coding
coefficients, which is also needed for the repair process and only occupies a negligible amount
of storage (see Section VII-A).
What really sets NC-Audit apart from [13] is that NC-Audit fully exploits network coding
for integrity checking. In particular, the scheme proposed in [13] relies on two independent
logical representation of file blocks for two different purposes: data possession checking and
network coding operation. Because of this, during the repair process, the user has to download
blocks from the remaining healthy nodes to compute the integrity checking data for the new
coded blocks (to be stored at the recovery node). This approach puts heavy bandwidth and
computational overhead on the user. In contrast, NC-Audit uses a single representation for both
purposes and thereby achieving integrity checking while eliminating the heavy user’s bandwidth
and computational overhead. Details of how NC-Audit support efficient repair are provided in
Section V. Furthermore, the scheme in [13] does not support privacy-preserving auditing while
NC-Audit does. We provide detailed performance comparison between NC-Audit and [13] in
Section VII.
Finally, a recent work by Cao et al. [34] proposed an LT codes-based storage system with
an integrity checking and an exact repair schemes; however, it neither supports functional repair
[7] (discussed in Section V) nor privacy-preserving auditing.
Other Security Issues. Other security problems for NC-based storage include protecting the
privacy and integrity of the blocks while repairing. The work in [42] and [43] prevents eaves-
droppers from accessing/decoding all the data. In [42], Pawar et al. provide an explicit code
construction that achieves the secrecy capacity for the bandwidth-limited regime of the storage
systems under repair dynamics. [43] analyzes the effects of interaction between the storage nodes
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Fig. 2. Parties and Steps Involved in NC-Audit.
on the amount of data revealed to the eavesdroppers. The work in [44] provides upper bounds on
the maximum amount of information that can be stored safely when there are malicious nodes.
In [44] and [45], the authors provide protection against pollution attacks during the repair. In
[45], Buttyan et al. provide a lightweight, pollution-resilient decoding algorithm that is capable
of finding adversarial blocks. The scheme in [13] also protects the repair phase against pollution
attacks, i.e., preventing remaining nodes from sending corrupted data to the new (recovering)
node. Dealing with pollution attacks is out of the scope of this work. We refer the reader to the
rich literature, including our previous work, that deal with pollution attacks [35]–[41].
C. This Work in Perspective
A preliminary version of this work has appeared in NetCod 2012 [46]. In this paper, we provide
the following revisions and extensions of the previous version: We revise and provide complete
proofs of all lemmas and theorems; we described in detail a repair process; we discuss and
compare our storage overhead to prior work [13], [17], [23]; finally, we provide a comprehensive
discussion of related literature.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model and Operations
Fig. 2 illustrates an overview of NC-Audit. We consider a cloud storage service that involves
three entities: a user, NC-based storage nodes, which make up the storage cloud, and a third
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party auditor (TPA). The user distributes his/her data on the storage nodes. The user resorts to
a TPA to check for the integrity of the data stored at each node; at the same time, he/she does
not want the TPA to learn about the outsourced data. We assume that the user is responsible
for repairing of a failed node. The user here acts as a proxy that manages the storage nodes as
in the case of NCCloud [33]. Our work is also applicable to scenarios where there is a cloud
service provider, who is independent from the user and acts as the proxy.
The user follows the following basic steps to store his/her data on the storage cloud. We adopt
the notation used in [40]. Denote the original file by F . The user first divides F into m blocks,
bˆ1, · · · , bˆm. Each block is a vector in an n-dimensional linear space Fnq , where F is a finite field
of size q. To facilitate the decoding, the user then augments each block bˆi with its m global
coding coefficients. The resulting blocks, bi, have the following form:
bi = (
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
—bˆi—,
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ Fn+mq .
We call bi source blocks and the space spanned by them source space, denoted by Π. We use
aug(bi) to denote the coefficients of bi. Typically, n  m, and this presentation is also called
an n-extended version of a storage code [26].
The user then creates a number of encoded blocks using an appropriate linear coding scheme
for the desired reliability, e.g., an array MDS Evenodd code is used in Fig. 1. Each encoded block
is a linear combination of the source blocks. Note that if an encoded block e equals
∑m
i=1 αi bi,
then the last m coordinates of e are exactly the coding coefficients αi’s. These encoded blocks
are then distributed across the N storage nodes of the storage cloud. Let M be the number of
encoded blocks stored at a storage node, P be the number of healthy nodes that need to send
the (encoded) repair blocks, and Q be the number of repair blocks each healthy node needs to
send to the new node. In the example given in Fig. 1, m = 4, N = 4, M = 2, P = 3, and
Q = 1.
B. Threat Model
We adopt the threat model considered in [17] and [24]. In particular, we consider semi-trusted
storage nodes that behave properly and do not deviate from the prescribed auditing protocol.
However, for their own benefits, they may deliberately delete rarely accessed, archival user’s
11
data to reduce operational cost; they may also decide to hide data corruptions, caused by either
internal or external factors to maintain reputation. For clarity, we focus our discussion on a
single storage node except when discussing the repair process.
We assume that the TPA, who is in the business of auditing, is reliable and independent. We
assume that the TPA does not collude with the storage node during the auditing process to hide
data corruption. This is a standard assumption when relying on a TPA for integrity checking
[17], [21], [23]. The TPA, however, must not be able to learn any information about the user’s
data through the auditing process, aside from the metadata needed for the auditing, as in [17].
In order words, the auditing protocol should not introduce a data leakage vulnerability. Similar
to standard applications of cryptographic protocols, we assume that both the node and the TPA
are fully aware of all the cryptographic constructions and protocols used; however, their runtime
is polynomial in the security parameter.
IV. AUDITING SCHEME
A. Definitions and Auditing Framework
We follow the literature of integrity checking of remote data [10], [15]–[17], [19] and adapt
the proposed framework to our privacy-preserving auditing system. In particular, we consider an
auditing scheme which consists of four algorithms:
• KeyGen(1λ)→ (kv, ke) is a key generation algorithm that is run by the user to setup the
scheme. It takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs two different private keys: kv
used to generate verification metadata, and ke used to encrypt the possession proof.
• TagGen(e, kv)→ t is an algorithm run by the user to generate the verification metadata.
It takes as input a coded block, e, a private key, kv, and outputs a verification tag of e, t.
• GenProof(ke, (e1, · · · , eM), (te1 , · · · , teM ), chal) → V is run by the storage node to gen-
erate a proof of possession. It takes as input a private key, ke; coded blocks stored at the
node, e1, · · · , eM ; their corresponding verification metadata, te1 , · · · , teM ; and a challenge,
chal, which includes block indices and coding coefficients. It outputs a proof of possession,
V , for the coded blocks determined by chal.
• VerifyProof(kv, chal, V ) → {1, 0} is run by the TPA in order to validate a proof of
possession. It takes as inputs a private key, kv, a challenge, chal, and a proof of possession
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V . It returns 1 (success) if V is the correct proof of possession for the blocks determined
by chal and 0 (failure) otherwise.
An auditing system can be constructed from the above algorithms and consists of two phases:
• Setup: The user initializes the security parameters of the system by running KeyGen. The
encoded blocks are prepared as previously described in Section III-A. The user then runs
TagGen to generate verification metadata for each encoded block. Afterwards, both the
encoded blocks and verification metadata are uploaded to the storage node. The encoded
blocks are then deleted from the user’s local storage. Finally, the user sends metadata needed
to perform the audit to the TPA.
• Audit: The TPA issues an audit message, i.e., a chal, to the storage node to make sure that
the node correctly stores its assigned coded blocks. The node generates a proof of possession
for the blocks specified in chal by running GenProof, and it sends the possession proof back
to the TPA. Finally, the TPA runs VerifyProof to verify the possession proof it receives.
B. Basic Scheme and Key Techniques
Here we describe the most basic scheme that supports remote data checking and show that it
does not provide the desired properties. This basic scheme is also described in [10]. Afterwards,
we describe how we improve this basic scheme to arrive at our proposed scheme.
The Basic Scheme. During the Setup phase, the user precomputes a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) tag, ti, for each coded block, ei, using a secret key, kv, and a standard MAC
scheme, e.g., HMAC. The user then uploads both the tags and the coded blocks to the storage
node and sends kv to the TPA. During the Audit phase, to verify that the node stores ei correctly,
the TPA issues a request for ei. The node then sends ei and its tag ti to the TPA. The TPA can
use kv and ti to check for the integrity of ei. Although providing the possession checking, this
scheme suffers from many drawbacks:
• It is inefficient in both computation and communication since the computation and band-
width overhead increases linearly in the number of checked blocks.
• It does not efficiently support node repair [6], [7]: It requires the user to download all
the blocks necessary to compute the new (recovering) blocks. The user then computes
verification tags for all the new blocks, essentially re-setting up the storage node.
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• It violates privacy because the TPA learns about the blocks. A straightforward way to
provide privacy is to encrypt the response block using a standard encryption scheme, e.g.,
AES. However, in this case, the TPA will not be able to verify the integrity of the original
block because the provided tag is not computed on the encrypted block but on the original
block.
Key Techniques. We improve the basic scheme to arrive at our proposed scheme by leveraging
a novel combination of (i) a homomorphic MAC scheme and (ii) a novel encryption scheme
that exploits properties of linear network coding.
In detail, we adopt SpaceMac, a homomorphic MAC scheme that we previously designed
specifically for network coding [27], [41]. We use SpaceMac to generate verification tags.
With SpaceMac, the integrity of multiple blocks can be verified with the computation and
communication cost of a single block verification, thanks to the ability to combine blocks and
tags. SpaceMac also facilitates repair as verification metadata at a newly constructed node can
be computed efficiently from existing metadata at healthy nodes.
We custom design a novel encryption scheme, called NCrypt, to protect the privacy of the
response blocks. NCrypt is constructed in a way that preserves the correctness of SpaceMac:
A response block, even when encrypted, can be used by the TPA for the integrity check. We
stress that it is not possible to use other standard encryption schemes, such as AES, in place
of NCrypt, because they will break the SpaceMac integrity verification. The reason is that in
general, a MAC tag computed on a data block can only be used to verify the integrity of the
block upon the reception of the tag and the data block, but it cannot be used when the encrypted
data block is received instead of the original block.
Formally, let (Enc,Dec) denote a symmetric-key encryption scheme and (Mac,Verify) denote
a MAC scheme. Let e be an (encoded) data block, and ke and kv be the keys for the encryption
and MAC schemes. Let c = Enc(ke, e) and t = Mac(kv, e). The encryption and MAC schemes
are compatible with each other when Verify(kv, c, t) outputs 1 if and only if c = Enc(ke, e) and
outputs 0 otherwise.
The main novelty of NCrypt lies in its compatibility with SpaceMac: It is carefully designed
to maintains both the correctness of SpaceMac (Theorem 3) as well as the security of SpaceMac
(Theorem 4). NCrypt employs the random linear combination technique of network coding and
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is semantically secure under a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA-secure). Next, we describe how we
use SpaceMac and NCrypt in detail.
C. The Homomorphic MAC: SpaceMac
In prior work, we originally designed SpaceMac and used it to combat pollution attacks in
network coding [27], [28], [40], [41]. SpaceMac was inspired by and an improvement of another
homomorphic MAC scheme, HomMac, proposed by Agrawal and Boneh [36]. The novelty of
SpaceMac and a detailed comparison between the two schemes can be found in [27], [41]. Here,
we adopt SpaceMac to support the aggregation of file blocks and tags to allow for efficient
auditing (similar to [15], [20]). Furthermore, as we show in Section V, SpaceMac also facilitates
efficient node repairs.
Definition. A (q, n,m) homomorphic MAC scheme is defined by three probabilistic, polynomial-
time algorithms: Mac, Combine, and Verify. The Mac algorithm generates a tag for a given block;
the Combine algorithm computes a tag for a linear combination of some given blocks; and the
Verify algorithm verifies whether a tag is a valid tag of a given block.
• Mac(k, id, e):
– Input: A secret key, k, the identifier, id, of the file, and a source block or encoded
block, e ∈ Fn+mq .
– Output: Tag t for e.
• Combine((e1, t1, α1), · · · , (e`, t`, α`)):
– Input: ` blocks, e1, · · · , e`, their tags, t1, · · · , t`, under key k, and their coefficients,
α1, · · · , α` ∈ Fq.
– Output: Tag t for block e def=
∑`
i=1 αi ei.
• Verify(k, id, e, t):
– Input: A secret key, k, the identifier, id, of the file, a block, e ∈ Fn+mq , and its tag, t.
– Output: 0 (reject) or 1 (accept).
Also, the scheme must satisfy the following correctness requirement:
Let t = Combine((e1, t1, α1), · · · , (e`, t`, α`)), then Verify
(
k, id,
∑`
i=1 αiei, t
)
= 1.
Note that the homomorphic property of the MAC scheme, or the existence of Combine, which
does not exist in regular MAC schemes, such as HMAC, ensures that multiple blocks can be
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audit at the bandwidth and verification computation cost of a single block.
Construction. SpaceMac consists of a triplet of algorithms: Mac, Combine, and Verify. The
construction of SpaceMac uses a pseudo-random function (PRF) F1 : K1×(I×[1, n+m])→ Fq,
where K1 is the PRF key domain and I is the file identifier domain.
• Mac(k, id, e) → t: The MAC tag t ∈ Fq of a source block or encoded block, denoted by
e ∈ Fn+mq , under key k, can be computed by the following steps:
– r← (F1(k, id, 1), · · · , F1(k, id, n+m)) .
– t← e · r ∈ Fq .
• Combine((e1, t1, α1), · · · , (e`, t`, α`)) → t: The tag t ∈ Fq of e def=
∑`
i=1 αi ei ∈ Fn+mq is
computed as follows:
– t←∑`i=1 αi ti ∈ Fq .
• Verify(k, id, e, t)→ {0, 1}: To verify if t is a valid tag of e under key k, we do the following:
– r← (F1(k, id, 1), · · · , F1(k, id, n+m)) .
– t′ ← e · r .
– If t′ = t, output 1 (accept); otherwise, output 0 (reject).
Lemma 1 (Theorem 1 in [27]). Assume that F1 is a secure PRF. For any fixed q, n, m, SpaceMac
is a secure (q, n,m) homomorphic MAC scheme.
We refer the reader to [27] for the security game and proof of SpaceMac. We provide security
proof of SpaceMac when used in NC-Audit in Section VI-A. If the user computes the verification
tags for the source blocks using the Mac algorithm of SpaceMac, then the storage node can
compute a valid MAC tag for any encoded block using the Combine algorithm. The security of
SpaceMac guarantees that if a block, e′, is not a linear combination of the source blocks, then
the storage node can only forge a valid MAC tag for e′ with probability 1
q
. The security when
using ` tags is improved to 1
q`
. For clarity, we focus on a single file F and thus omit the file
identifier id used by the above three algorithms in our subsequent discussion.
D. The Random Linear Encryption: NCrypt
To protect the privacy of the response file block, we need to encrypt it. The encryption,
however, needs to still allow for the verification of the block. To this end, we design a novel
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encryption scheme that is compatible with SpaceMac, called NCrypt. In particular, NCrypt will
protect n−2 elements of the response block while still allowing SpaceMac integrity checking. The
remaining 2 elements are random padded elements. These 2 elements are needed to guarantee
the security of the schemes, as we will show in the construction and proofs of NCrypt and
SpaceMac1.
Let x¯ denote the vector formed by the first n− 2 elements of a vector x. The construction of
NCrypt uses two PRFs: F2 : K2×([1, n−1]×[1, n−2])→ Fq and F3 : K2×({0, 1}λ×[1, n−1])→
Fq, where K2 is a PRF key domain. NCrypt consists of three probabilistic, polynomial time
algorithms:
• Setup(k, r¯) → (p1, · · · , pn−1): This algorithm is run by the user to setup the encryption
scheme. It takes as input a secret key k and a vector r¯ 6= 0, r¯ ∈ Fn−2q . It outputs n − 1
elements in Fq , which are called auxiliary elements and are used by the encryption. The
details are as follows:
– Compute p¯i ← (F2(k, i, 1), · · · , F2(k, i, n− 2)) ∈ Fn−2q , for i ∈ [1, n− 1].
– Compute pi ← r¯ · p¯i ∈ Fq, for i ∈ [1, n− 1].
• Enc(k, e¯, (p1, · · · , pn−1))→ 〈c¯, (r, p)〉: This algorithm is run by the storage node to encrypt
the n − 2 first elements of the aggregated response block. It takes as input a secret key,
k, vector formed by the first n − 2 elements of the response block, e¯, and the auxiliary
elements, p1, · · · , pn−1. It computes the encryption, 〈c¯, (r, p)〉, of e¯ as follows:
– Compute p¯i, i ∈ [1, n− 1], using key k as in Setup.
– Choose r uniformly at random: r R← {0, 1}λ.
– Compute the masking coefficients: βi ← F3(k, r, i) ∈ Fq, for i ∈ [1, n− 1] .
– Compute the masking vector: m¯←∑n−1i=1 βi p¯i ∈ Fn−2q .
– Compute c¯← e¯ + m¯ ∈ Fn−2q .
– Compute p←∑n−1i=1 βi pi ∈ Fq .
In essence, the data is masked with a randomly chosen vector m¯ ∈ span(p¯1, · · · , p¯n−1).
• Dec(k, 〈c¯, (r, p)〉) → e¯: This algorithm takes as input a secret key, k, and the cipher text,
1In particular, the 2 random padded elements is to control the number of equations in the system of equations Π1 and Π2
described in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 4, respectively. Intuitively, these 2 random elements are needed to compensate for the
extra information learned by the adversary in NCrypt (the element p as part of the ciphertext) and in SpaceMac (the equations
related to r¯).
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〈c¯, (r, p)〉. The decryption is done as follows:
– Compute p¯i, i ∈ [1, n− 1], using key k as in Setup.
– Compute βi ← F3(k, r, i) ∈ Fq, for i ∈ [1, n− 1].
– Compute m¯←∑n−1i=1 βi p¯i ∈ Fn−2q .
– Compute e¯← c¯− m¯ ∈ Fn−2q .
Theorem 2. Assume that F2 and F3 are secure PRFs, then NCrypt is a fixed-length private-key
encryption scheme for messages of length (n−2)× log2 q that has indistinguishable encryptions
under a chosen-plaintext attack.
Proof: Intuitively, the security of NCrypt holds because m¯ looks completely random to
an adversary who observes a ciphertext 〈c¯, (r, p)〉 since it is computationally difficult for the
adversary to compute βi’s without knowing the secret key k.
The proof follows a textbook technique used to prove the security of Construction 3.24 in [47].
We follow the notation in [47]. Denote the CPA security experiment of an encryption scheme
Π = (Setup,Enc,Dec) and an adversary A by PrivKcpaA,Π. The game is as follows:
• A key k is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}λ.
• The adversary A is given r¯, p1, · · · , pn−1, and oracle access to Enck. A outputs a pair of
messages e¯0 and e¯1, both are in Fn−2q .
• A random bit b← {0, 1} is chosen, and then a ciphertext c← Enc(k, e¯b, (p1, · · · , pn−1)) is
computed and given to A. We call c the challenge ciphertext.
• The adversary A continues to have oracle access to Enck, and outputs a bit b′.
• The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise. In case PrivKcpaA,Π =
1, we say that A succeeded.
Let Π1 be an encryption scheme that is exactly the same as Π except that a truly random
function f2 is used in place of F2. Let Adv[B, F2] be the probability of an adversary B with
similar runtime to A winning the PRF security game (can tell a pseudo-random function F2
from a truly random function f2). By the security of PRF, we have that Adv[B, F2] is negligible
in λ and it can be shown that (details are provided in the proof of Construction 3.24 in [47])
Adv[B, F2] = |Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π = 1]− Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π1 = 1]| . (1)
Similarly, let Π2 be an encryption scheme that is exactly the same as Π1 except that a truly
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random function f3 is used in place of F3. Let Adv[C, F3] be the probability of an adversary C
with similar runtime to A winning the PRF security game. Similar to the above, by the security
of PRF, we have that Adv[B, F3] is negligible in λ and
Adv[C, F3] = |Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π1 = 1]− Pr[PrivKcpaA,Π2 = 1]| . (2)
We claim that for every adversary A that makes at most g(λ) queries to its encryption oracle,
where g is a polynomial function, we have
Pr
[
PrivKcpaA,Π2 = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+
g(λ)
2λ
. (3)
Let rc denote the random string used when generating the challenge ciphertext, which is of
the form 〈c¯, (rc, p)〉 (by encrypting e¯b). There are two cases:
(a) rc is never used by the oracle in the encryption algorithm to produce ciphertext to answer
any of A’s queries: In the following, we will show that each element of any plaintext e¯ is masked
with a uniformly random value, thus the adversary will not be able to tell which message (e¯0
or e¯1) was encrypted, as in the case of one-time pad.
Parse e¯ as (e(1), · · · , e(n−2)), m¯ as (m(1), · · · ,m(n−2)), and p¯i as (p(1)i , · · · , p(n−2)i ). From a
ciphertext returned from an oracle query of e¯, the adversary can construct the following system
of equations Π1 by subtracting the query plaintext from the ciphertext:
(Π1)

β1 p
(1)
1 + · · ·+ βn−1 p(1)n−1 = m(1)
· · ·
β1 p
(n−2)
1 + · · ·+ βn−1 p(n−2)n−1 = m(n−2)
β1p1 + · · ·+ βn−1pn−1 = p
.
Note that p(j)i are not all zeros w.h.p. since they are chosen uniformly at random from Fq by
f2. Let βi be unknowns, i ∈ [1, n− 1]. The above system of n− 1 linear equations is consistent
regardless of the values of m(j)’s since the rank of the coefficient matrix is at most n−1, which is
the number of unknowns. Let s be the rank of the coefficient matrix. Now for any w ∈ [1, n−2],
assume that all m(j), j 6= w, j ∈ [1, n − 2], are fixed. Then m(w) still can take any value in Fq
equally likely because (i) for any value of m(w), there is the same number of solutions, which
is qn−1−s, and (ii) βj are chosen uniformly at random from Fq (as a truly random function f3
is used in place of F3). Thus, each element of the plaintext, e(w), is masked with a uniformly
19
random value, m(w), independent of other masking elements mj 6=w, j ∈ [1, n−2]. Therefore, the
probability that A outputs b′ = b is exactly 1/2, as in the case of the one-time pad.
(b) rc is used by the oracle to answer at least one of A’s queries: In this case, A may easily
determine which of its messages was encrypted. This is because whenever the oracle returns a
ciphertext, 〈c¯, (r, p)〉, it learns the masking vector m¯ associated with r as m¯ = c¯ − e¯. Thus,
by leveraging the corresponding m¯ of rc, the adversary can tell if e¯0 or e¯1 was encrypted by
actually decrypting the challenge response. Since A makes at most g(λ) queries, and r is chosen
uniformly at random, the probability of this event is at most g(λ)/2λ.
Equation (3) follows from (a) and (b). Equations (1), (2), and (3) show that
Pr
[
PrivKcpaA,Π = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+
g(λ)
2λ
+ (λ) ,
where  is a cryptographically negligible function in λ. This completes the proof.
E. The Privacy-Preserving Auditing Scheme: NC-Audit
Now we are ready to describe our symmetric-key based auditing protocol, called NC-Audit.
In particular, NC-Audit is built from a novel combination of SpaceMac and NCrypt as follows:
Setup phase:
• The user divides the file into m blocks of size n−2 instead of n and pads to each block two
random elements in Fq. This is necessary as NCrypt encrypts only the first n− 2 elements.
We still denote each padded block with its coding coefficients by bi, i ∈ [1,m].
• The user runs KeyGen to generate MAC verification key, kv, and encryption key, ke:
– KeyGen(1λ)→ (ke, kv): ke R← {0, 1}λ, kv R← {0, 1}λ.
• The user then setups the encryption scheme by computing the auxiliary elements, p1, · · · , pn−1:
– r¯← (F1(kv, 1), · · · , F1(kv, n− 2)).
– (p1, · · · , pn−1)← Setup(ke, r¯).
• Afterward, the user computes a tag for each source block bi using the Mac algorithm of
SpaceMac:
– tbi = Mac(kv,bi).
• The user computes MAC tags of encoded blocks using the Combine algorithm of SpaceMac.
Assume e =
∑m
i=1 αi bi, then its tag is computed as follows:
– TagGen(e, kv)→ te =
∑m
i=1 αi tbi .
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• Finally, the user sends the encoded blocks, e1, · · · , eM , their tags, te1 , · · · , teM , the auxiliary
elements, p1, · · · , pn−1, and the encryption key, ke, to the storage node. The user also sends
the coding coefficients, aug(e1), · · · , aug(eM), and the MAC key, kv, to the TPA. We assume
that the user uses private and authentic channels to send kv and ke2. The user then keeps
the coding coefficients and the keys but delete all other data.
Note that maintaining coding coefficients is necessary for the repair process and is an inherent
characteristic of NC storage systems. The overhead of storing the coefficients is negligible
compared to the outsource data and could be constant for practical purposes (see Section VII-A).
If the user outsources the management of the nodes to a third party, such as a proxy as in
NCCloud [33], then he/she does not need to store the coding coefficients. However, in this case,
the proxy must be trusted.
Audit phase:
• The TPA chooses a set of indexes of blocks to be audited, I ⊆ [1,M ], and chooses the
coefficients for these blocks uniformly at random: αi
R← Fq, i ∈ I. The challenge includes
the indexes of the blocks and their corresponding coefficients:
– Prepare chal = {(i, αi) | i ∈ I}.
• GenProof run by the storage node to generate the proof of storage, V , is implemented as
follows:
– Compute the aggregated block: eˆ =
∑
i∈I αi eˆi. Parse eˆ as (e¯, e
(n−1), e(n)).
– Compute the aggregated tag: t =
∑
i=∈I αi tei .
– Encrypt the response block: 〈c¯, (r, p)〉 ← Enc(ke, e¯, (p1, · · · , pn−1)).
The node then sends V = (〈c¯, (r, p)〉, e(n−1), e(n), t) back to the TPA.
• VerifyProof run by the TPA to verify the proof V is implemented as follows:
– Compute coefficients of eˆ: aug(e) =
∑
i∈I αi aug(ei).
– Let c = (c¯ | e(n−1) | e(n) | aug(e)), where “|” denotes augmentation.
Return result of Verify(kv, c, t+ p).
2Exchanging secret keys, in particular, and establishing secure and authentic channels, in general, could be done with the
support of a public key infrastructure (PKI). This is an important, well studied problem in the cryptography community and is
orthogonal to this work.
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Correctness. The correctness of NC-Audit, i.e., if the file is correct then the algorithm will accept
the proof, is guaranteed by the following Lemma 3. And its security, i.e., if there is corruption
then the algorithm will reject the proof, is proved in Section VI.
Lemma 3. If the storage node follows NC-Audit and computes the aggregated response block
using uncorrupted blocks, then the TPA will accept the proof.
Proof: Let r = (F1(kv, 1), · · · , F1(kv, n+m)). Note that
c = (c¯ | e(n−1) | e(n) | aug(e))
= ((e¯ + m¯) | e(n−1) | e(n) | aug(e)) = e + (m¯ | 0, · · · , 0) .
Thus, in the Verify,
t′ = c · r = e · r + m¯ · r¯
= t+
n−1∑
i=1
βi p¯i · r¯ = t+
n−1∑
i=1
βi pi = t+ p .
Therefore, Verify returns 1. Hence, the TPA accepts the proof.
V. SUPPORT FOR NODE REPAIR
When there is a node failure, the user creates a new node to replace this node. Based on the
coding coefficients of the coded blocks at the remaining healthy nodes, the user instructs the
healthy nodes to send appropriate coded blocks to the new node. The new node then linearly
combines them, according to the user instruction, to construct its own coded blocks. This new
node may construct the same coded blocks that the failed node had (exact repair), or completely
different coded blocks that still preserve the same level of reliability (functional repair) [6]. In
the example given in Fig. 1, the user instructs the first three storage nodes to send coded blocks
to exactly repair the fourth node.
Formally, for each healthy node, Ni, i = 1, · · · , P , recall that it needs to send Q encoded repair
blocks to the new node. Let (ei,1, · · · , ei,M) be the encoded blocks currently stored on Ni. For
j = 1, · · · , Q, the user sends a set of repair coding coefficients (γi,j,1, · · · , γi,j,M) to Ni. This
node then uses these coefficients to compute the repair blocks, gi,j =
∑M
k=1 γi,j,k ei,k, to send to
the new node. The new node will receive P×Q repair blocks, gi,j , from the healthy nodes. It uses
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them to reconstruct the encoded blocks, h1, · · · ,hM , that it needs to store. For k = 1, · · · ,M ,
the user sends a set of P × Q reconstruction coding coefficients, (θi,j,k, · · · θP,Q,k), to the new
node to instruct its reconstruction. The new node then reconstructs hk =
∑P
i=1
∑Q
j=1 θi,j,k gi,j .
Note that the coding coefficients γ’s and θ’s are dependent on the repairing scheme.
Using NC-Audit, the verification tags of the newly constructed blocks, hk, at the new node
do not need to be computed by the user. In particular, the healthy nodes can send along the
verification tags of the repair blocks, gi,j , that they send to the new node, where the tags of gi,j
can be computed using the Combine algorithm of SpaceMac on the tags of ei,k. The new node
then can also use Combine on the tags of gi,j to generate tags of hk. Finally, the user sends the
coding coefficients of the coded blocks at the newly constructed node, aug(hk) (dependent on
the repair scheme), to the TPA so that it can audit this new node.
Consequently, with NC-Audit, there is negligible cost to the user when repairing a failed node,
in terms of both bandwidth and computation of verification metadata. In particular, the user does
not need to download data, i.e., ei,k, and the user also does not need to compute the tags, i.e.,
runs Mac on hk. This stands in stark contrast with the prior integrity checking scheme for NC-
based storage [13], which requires the user to download many data blocks (equal to the repair
bandwidth) and compute security metadata for the newly coded blocks him/herself.
Last but not least, since the TPA audits the new node based on the new set of coefficients, a
malicious node cannot carry out a replay attack [13] (discussed in Section II-B); otherwise, it
will not pass the audit because the SpaceMac tags are computed on both the data and coefficients.
Here we assume that the healthy remaining nodes send valid data and tags to the new node. If
there is a malicious node that sends corrupted data or tags, the storage systems is considered
polluted. Dealing with pollution attacks is out of the scope of this paper; we refer the reader to
previous work, including our own, which explicitly combats pollution attacks [28], [35]–[38],
[40], [41], [45], [48].
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Data Possession Guarantee
When using SpaceMac in NC-Audit, some information about the vector r in the SpaceMac
construction is available to the adversary. In particular, the storage node knows the following
n − 1 equations: p¯i · r¯ = pi , i ∈ [1, n − 1]. The following theorem states that even when these
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n−1 equations are exposed, SpaceMac is still a secure homomorphic MAC, i.e., any corruption
will be detected w.h.p.
Theorem 4. Assume that F1 is a secure PRF. For any fixed q, n, m, assume that a probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A knows any n − 1 linearly independent vectors, p¯1, · · · , p¯n−1,
and any n − 1 constants, p1, · · · , pn−1, such that p¯i · r¯ = pi, where r is used in the con-
struction of SpaceMac. The probability that A wins the SpaceMac security game, denoted by
Adv[A, SpaceMac], is at most
PRF-Adv[B, F1] + 1
q
,
where PRF-Adv[B, F1] is the probability of an adversary B with similar runtime to A winning
the PRF security game.
Proof: The security game, called the Attack Game 1, of SpaceMac involves a challenger C
and an adversary A, and is as follows:
• Setup. C generates a random key k R← K
• Queries. A adaptively queries C, where each query is of the form (id,y). For each query,
C replies to A with the corresponding tag t← Mac(k, id,y).
• Output. A eventually outputs a tuple (id∗,y∗, t∗).
Up to the time A outputs, it has queried C multiple times. Let l denote the number of times A
queried C using id∗ and get tags for l vectors, y∗1, · · · ,y∗l , of these queries. We consider that the
adversary wins the security game if and only if
• (y(n+1)∗ , · · · , y(n+m)∗ ) 6= 0 (trivial forge otherwise),
• Verify(k, id∗,y∗, t∗) = 1, and
• y∗ /∈ span(y∗1, · · · ,y∗l ).
Here, we prove Theorem 4 with respect to a slightly different security game, called Attack
Game 2. This Attack Game 2 is similar to Attack Game 1, except that in the Queries phase,
for each distinct id, the space spanned by the vectors used in the queries has dimension at most
m. This Attack Game 2 is stricter but better fits the reality: since the dimension of the source
space Π is only m, the adversary must only learn tags of vectors in spaces having dimensions
at most m.
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Now the proof is done by using a sequence of games denoted Game 0 and Game 1. Let W0
and W1 denote the events that A wins the homomorphic MAC security in Game 0 and Game
1, respectively. Game 0 is identical to Attack Game 2 applied to the scheme SpaceMac. Hence,
Pr[W0] = Adv[A, SpaceMac] (4)
Game 1 is identical to Game 0 except that the challenger C computes r← (r1, · · · , rn+m), where
ri is chosen uniformly at random from Fq: ri
R← Fq instead of ri ← F (k, id, i), and everything
else remains the same. Then, there exists a PRF adversary B such that
|Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]| = PRF-Adv[B, F ] (5)
The complete challenger in Game 1 works as follows:
Queries. A adaptively queries C, where each query is of the form (id,y). If id is already used
in m previous query, C discards the query. Otherwise, C replies to query i of A as follows:
if id is never used in any of the previous queries:
ri := (r
i
1, · · · , rin+m), where rij R← Fq, j ∈ [1, n+m]
else:
ri := the one used in the previous response
send t := yi · ri to A
Output. A eventually outputs a tuple (id∗,y∗, t∗). When y∗ does not equal 0, to determine if A
wins the game, we compute
if id∗ = idi (for some i) then // case (i)
set r∗ := ri
else // case (ii)
set r∗ := (r∗1, · · · , r∗n+m), where r∗i R← Fq, i ∈ [1, n+m]
Let l denote the number of times A queried C using id∗ and get tags for l vectors, y∗1, · · · ,y∗l ,
of these queries. The adversary wins the game, i.e., event W1 happens, if and only if
t∗ = y∗ · r∗ , and (6)
y∗ /∈ span(y∗1, · · · ,y∗l ) . (7)
Subsequently, we will show that Pr[W1] = 1q . Let T be the event that A outputs a tuple with
a completely new id∗, i.e., A never made queries using id∗ before.
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• When T happens, i.e., in case (ii), since r∗i ’s are indistinguishable from random values and
(y
(n+1)
∗ , · · · , y(n+m)∗ ) 6= 0, the right hand side of equation (6) is a completely random value in
Fq. Thus,
Pr[W1 ∧ T ] = 1
q
Pr[T ] . (8)
• When T does not happen, i.e., in case (i): r∗ of equation (6) equals ri for some i, and r∗ has
been used to generate tags for vectors y∗1, · · · ,y∗l . In this case, we proceed by showing that for
a fixed y∗, t∗ looks indistinguishable from a random value in Fq. The given prior knowledge,
the queries, and the output form the following system of linear equations Π2:
(Π2)

p¯1 · r¯∗ = p1
· · ·
p¯n−1 · r¯∗ = pn−1
y∗1 · r∗ = ty∗1
· · ·
y∗l · r∗ = ty∗l
y∗ · r∗ = t∗
.
Let the elements r∗i , i ∈ [1, n + m], of r∗ be the unknowns of the system. The above system
is consistent regardless of the value of t∗ because the coefficient matrix has rank at most n+m,
which equals the number of unknowns. Let d be the rank of the coefficient matrix, d ≤ n+m.
For a fixed y∗, its valid tag t∗ could be any value in Fq equally likely because (i) for any value
t∗, the solution space always has the same size qn+m−d, and (ii) r∗i ’s are chosen uniformly at
random from Fq. As a result, the probability that the adversary chooses a correct t∗ is 1/q. Thus,
Pr[W1 ∧ ¬T ] = 1
q
Pr[¬T ] . (9)
• From equations (8) and (9), we have
Pr[W1] = Pr[W1 ∧ T ] + Pr[W1 ∧ ¬T ] = 1
q
. (10)
Equations (4), (5), and (10) together prove the theorem.
Now, we are ready to prove the data possession guarantee of NC-Audit.
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Lemma 5. With probability at least 1 − 2
q
, the storage node can pass a check if and only if it
possesses the blocks specified in the challenge of the check.
Proof: Lemma 3 shows that if the storage node possesses the data then it can pass the check.
It remains to show that if the node passes the check then it possesses the corresponding blocks
w.h.p. Let us prove the converse, i.e., if there are corrupted or missing blocks, the node will
fail the check w.h.p. For simplicity, we assume that when responding to a challenge involving
a block that no longer exists in the storage, the node replaces it with a block chosen uniformly
at random in Fn+mq .
Case (a) - The storage node is able to compute a correct response block even when some
blocks are missing or corrupted: Denote the correct, unencrypted aggregated block by e, i.e.,
e =
∑
i∈I αi ei. Denote the data of the response block actually computed by the storage node
by aˆ and denote (aˆ | aug(e)) by a. If there is at least one error in the data of one of the block or
there is at least one missing block, then Prob[aˆ = eˆ] ≤ 1
q
because α’s are chosen uniformly at
random from Fq. Note that e is in the source space: e ∈ Π, thus if aˆ 6= eˆ then a /∈ Π. Therefore,
Prob[a ∈ Π] = Prob[a = e] ≤ 1
q
.
Case (b) - The storage node responds with an incorrect block: The security of SpaceMac from
Theorem 4 guarantees that the node can provide a valid tag of a /∈ Π with probability at most
1
q
. Without loss of generality, we can ignore the encryption because if the node already knows
a valid tag of a, it can provide the correct encryption to pass the check. Meanwhile, if the node
does not know a valid tag of a, its chance of forging a valid tag for the cipher text c is still
bounded by the security guarantee of SpaceMac, which is at most 1
q
.
As a result, from cases (a) and (b), the probability of passing the check when there is error
or missing block is at most 2
q
.
Not only does NC-Audit provide detection in the presence of corrupted or missing blocks,
it also ensures that the user can extract the data stored on the storage node just by collecting
responses of the node from the checking protocol. This is also known as the retrievability
property. We provide the proof of retrievability based on the theoretical framework of [19],
which is derived from [15] and [16].
Lemma 6. Assume that the storage node responds correctly to a fraction, 1−, of the challenges
uniformly, where  < 1
2
. The user can extract the encoded blocks stored on the node, e1, · · · , eM ,
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by performing γ challenge-response interactions with the storage node with high probability
(depending on γ, , and q).
Proof: Lemma 5 implies that if a node responds correctly to a fraction of challenge, then
with probability at least 1− 2
q
, the response block is a correct linear combination of the blocks
stored at the node. For a challenge coefficient vector (α1, · · · , αM), the user can challenge the
node using a number of constant-multiples of the vector, e.g., (c α1, · · · , c αM) for some constant
c, to learn the responses (including incorrect responses), and then use majority decoding to learn
the correct equation
∑M
i=1 αiei = d, where d is some constant vector. By collecting M linearly
independent equations of this form, the user can solve for e1, · · · , eM using Gaussian elimination.
Note that for a fixed  < 1
2
, the probability of learning one correct equation depends on both
q and the number of queries made using the multiples of the corresponding coefficient vector.
For a fixed q, this probability can be made arbitrarily high by increasing the number of queries.
B. Privacy-Preserving Guarantee
NCrypt provides the privacy guarantee of NC-Audit, which we stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. From the responses of the storage node, the TPA does not learn any information
about the outsourced data, except for the information that could be derived from the MAC tag.
Proof: The claim is a direct consequence of Theorem 2 and the fact that the padding
elements are chosen randomly.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Client Storage Overhead
NC-Audit requires the user and the TPA to store the coding coefficients, which is in O(mMN)
space. The user needs the coefficients to carry out repairs while the TPA needs the coefficients
to carry out audits. In any case, the overhead of O(mMN) is orders of magnitude less than
the outsourced data, which is in O((n + m)MN) space; this is because n  m for NC-based
storage systems. In fact, in a practical NC storage cloud, the space necessary for storing the
coding coefficients could be kept less than 160 B (i.e., constant storage) while being able to
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support arbitrary file size (by increasing the block size n, see Section 5.1 of NCCloud [33]).
Table I compares client storage overhead of NC-Audit and other state-of-the-art schemes [13],
[17], [23].
B. Bandwidth Overhead
Integrity Checking. For each audit round, the major communication cost is the cost of sending
the proof of possession from the storage node to the TPA, which is dominated by the size
of the (encrypted) data bock. Thanks to homormophic property of SpaceMac, blocks in the
challenge can be aggregated. We achieve similar bandwidth overhead compared to prior schemes
for integrity checking of cloud data [13], [15], [17], [23]. In particular, the proof of possession
for multiple blocks contains only a single block (of size varying from 4 KB [10] to 1.6 MB
[13]).
Repairing. As discussed in Section V, when using NC-Audit, the user does not need to
download any data block to repair a failed node. This stands in stark contrast with the state-of-
the-art scheme for NC storage systems [13], where the user needs to download an amount of data
equal to the repair bandwidth to setup integrity metadata for the new coded blocks him/herself.
Encryption. The amount of additional bandwidth to support encryption is small. In particular,
NCrypt requires the storage node to send with the encrypted block, c¯; the random value, r, of
size λ (typically 80 bits [10]); the auxiliary tag, p, and the random padding elements, e(n−1), e(n),
which are of size log2 q. These are negligible compared to the block size: n log2 q, e.g., 0.3%
for q = 28, n = 4× 210 (4 KB block).
The bandwidth overhead of NC-Audit when compared to other schemes [13], [17], [23] are
summarized in Table I.
C. Computational Overhead
We first analyze the cost of each operation in NC-Audit by the number of finite field multipli-
cations involved, which is the dominating cost factor. We then present the cost of each operation
from our real implementation in Java. We omit the cost of computing PRF values that do not
take as input random seeds since they can be precomputed.
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Wang 2009 [23] Wang 2010 [17] Chen 2010 [13] NC-Audit
Features
Public-Key Audit Public-Key Audit Private-Key Audit Private-Key Audit
No NC Repair No NC Repair NC Repair Efficient NC Repair
No Audit Privacy Audit Privacy No Audit Privacy Audit Privacy
Client Storage
Audit Overhead O(1) O(1) O(1) O(mMN)
Repair Overhead N/A N/A O(mMN) O(mMN)
Bandwidth
Audit Overhead 1 block 1 block 1 block 1 block
Repair Overhead N/A N/A repair bandwidth 0*
Enc. Overhead N/A 0* N/A 0*
Computation
Security 80-bit
Parameters 300 blocks per challenge, 4 KB block size
Testbed Config. 1.86 Ghz CPU, 2GB RAM 2.8 Ghz CPU, 32 GB RAM
Server Overhead 270 ms 273 ms 3.19 ms 4.69 ms
Auditor Overhead 491 ms 493 ms 2.76 s 0.73 ms
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT REMOTE DATA INTEGRITY CHECKING SCHEMES. 0* INDICATES NO DATA BLOCK NEEDS TO BE
DOWNLOADED BY THE USER TO SUPPORT THE FEATURE. N/A MEANS NOT APPLICABLE DUE TO THE LACK OF SUPPORT.
Integrity Checking with Encryption:
1. Storage Node Overhead: In NC-Audit, the cost to compute a proof of possession includes the
cost to compute (i) the aggregated response block, e¯, (ii) the response tag, t, (iii) the masking
vector, m¯, and the auxiliary element, p. The total cost is dominated by the cost to compute e¯
and m¯. m¯ can be precomputed in advance as it is independent of the challenge. Let C be the
average number of blocks specified in a challenge. The average cost to compute a response per
challenge is C × n multiplications with a precomputation of m¯ and C × n+ (n− 2)× (n− 1)
without.
2. TPA Overhead: In NC-Audit, verifying a proof of possession can be done very efficiently.
In particular, the cost to verify include the time to (i) compute the coefficients of the response
block and (ii) run the Verify of SpaceMac. Let ` be the number of tags used (to increase the
security to 1/q`). The total cost is C ×m+ `× (n+m) multiplications.
Repairing:
As described in Section V, repairing a failed node does not incur any computation cost at the
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user side to maintain the security metadata of the auditing.
Implementation:
We implement NC-Audit in Java to compare its performance with the state-of-the-art schemes
[13], [17], [23]. For a fair of comparison with [17], [23], we use q = 28 and ` = 10 to provide
80-bit security, and we also set block size to 4 KB (n = 4 × 210), m = 500, and the number
of blocks indicated by a challenge to C = 300. We stress that the choice of parameters may be
different in a practical NC storage system, e.g., in [33], a block size could be as big as 4 MB
while the storage space taken by the coefficients could be kept below 160 B. We implement finite
field multiplications in F28 by table look-ups and additions using XORs. We also precomputed
values that do not depend on the challenges.
Table I compares the computational overhead of different remote data integrity checking
schemes. The reported numbers for [23] and [17] are taken from [17]. (The overhead of the
scheme in [23] is similar to the public-key based scheme in [15].) We refer the reader to [17]
for the detailed setup. We implement the checking scheme in [13] ourselves. For this scheme,
we use AES with CBC mode from the Java crypto library to decrypt coding coefficients. We
refer the reader to Appendix A in [13] for the detailed description of this scheme. The number
reported for NC-Audit and the scheme in [13] are the average of 100 runs on a computer with
2.8 Ghz CPU and 32 GB RAM. We note that among the three schemes under comparison [13],
[17], [23], the scheme in [13] is the only one specifically designed for NC storage systems and
thus supports NC repair.
Table I shows that NC-Audit manages to achieve very modest computational overhead. The
computational overhead of NC-Audit is orders of magnitude smaller than those of [23] and [17].
This is due to the fact that NC-Audit is symmetric-key based while the schemes in [17] and
[23] are public-key based and make heavily use of expensive bilinear mapping operations3. The
scheme in [13] achieves similar storage node’s computational overhead to NC-Audit as it is also
symmetric-key based. However, due to the cost of executing C × m = 150, 000 numbers of
decryption for the coefficients, the computational overhead of the TPA of [13] is much larger
3Due to the fundamental difference: the use of expensive bilinear mapping operations in [17], [23], we expect a similar gap
(in order of magnitude) between the computational overhead of [17], [23] and that of NC-Audit when we run them on the same
hardware.
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than that of NC-Audit, in the order of seconds as opposed to milliseconds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose NC-Audit, a cryptography-based remote data integrity checking
scheme for NC-based storage systems. NC-Audit is based on a novel combination of an existing
MAC scheme custom made for network coding, SpaceMac, and a novel CPA-secure encryption
scheme, NCrypt, which we carefully design in this work to work in synergy with SpaceMac. To
the best of our knowledge, NC-Audit is the first scheme that efficiently supports auditing for NC
storage systems. NC-Audit also provides protection against leakage of the outsourced data when
the audit is done by a third party. Our evaluation results based on a real implementation in Java
demonstrate that NC-Audit is significantly more efficient than the state-of-the-art schemes.
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APPENDIX
SUPPORT FOR DATA DYNAMICS
NC-Audit supports data dynamics and does not require data block download (blockless) in
all operations. The approach taken by NC-Audit is similar to [18] but different from [22] and
[23]: NC-Audit fully supports block append and update operations, while relying on these two
operations to further support insert and delete operations. Fully supporting all operations, as
in [22] and [23], come with a higher client and server computation as well as communication
overhead. This is because additional data structures, such as a skip-list [22] or a binary tree
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Fig. 3. Appending a new block, b5, to an existing coded storage system (on top, as in Fig 1). The new system can still tolerate
any two-node failure by leveraging an EVENODD code [49]. The user needs to upload b5 to nodes 2, 3, and 4, and instruct
node 1 to sends to b1, b2, and their MAC tags to node 4.
[23], must be maintained. We choose the simpler approach since data modification is typically
of limited use for coded storage systems, as discussed in Section II-A.
Block Append. Assume that the user wants to append a block, bˆ∗, to the system. The coded
blocks stored at the nodes are now a linear combination of the original source blocks, b1, · · · ,bm,
and the new block b∗. The encoded blocks stored at each node are updated based on the coding
scheme used to attain the required level of reliability.
For instance, Fig. 3 shows how a new block, b5, could be added to an existing storage system
(on top, as in Fig 1), where the new system can still tolerate any two-node failure by leveraging
an EVENODD code [49]. Note that coded blocks at node 4 are completely changed. One way
the user could achieve the new system is by instructing node 1 to send b1, b2, and their MAC
tags to node 4 and also sending b5 to nodes 2, 3, and 4 him/herself.
We focus our discussion on how security metadata can be maintained correctly and efficiently
and assume that an appropriate update scheme for the data is in place, as shown in Fig. 3. When
an append is needed, the encoded b∗ has the following form:
b∗ = (
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
—bˆ∗—,
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, 1) ∈ Fn+m+1q .
To maintain the security metadata, the user first computes the tag tb∗ of b∗ under kv using
Mac (now for vectors with size n+m+ 1) as follows:
– r← (F1(kv, 1), · · · , F1(kv, n+m+ 1)) .
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– tb∗ ← b∗ · r ∈ Fq .
It then sends tb∗ to all storage nodes that have coded packets that involve b∗ when sending b∗
to the nodes.
Note that when an append happens, the vector representation of a previous source block,
bi, i ∈ [1,m], is appended with a zero. However, its verification tag, computed using Mac,
remains the same since 0× F1(k, n+m+ 1) = 0. Consequently, for coded packets that do not
involve b∗, their tags remain the same, i.e., if e =
∑m
i=1 αi bi, then its new tag equals is old tag:
t′e = te =
∑m
i=1 αi tbi . For coded packets that involve b∗, the storage node can compute their
new tags using tb∗ . Assume α∗ of b∗ is added to e, then te′ = te + α∗ tb∗ .
Afterwards, the user sends the new coding coefficients of the new coded blocks stored at the
nodes to the TPA. Since the TPA carries out audits using this new set of coefficients, if the
storage node does not update its data and tag correctly, it will not pass the subsequent audits. In
particular, since the TPA computes aug(e) in VerifyProof locally, if the response block eˆ (before
encryption) is not updated correctly, in the proof of Theorem 3, c 6= e + (m¯ | 0, · · · , 0). Thus,
by the security guarantee of SpaceMac, VerifyProof will fail w.h.p.
Block Update. Assume the user wants to update the source block, bj , for some j ∈ [1,m].
Denote the new block after the update b′j . To update the data, it needs to send b
′
j to nodes that
store coded blocks involving bj . For example, to update b3 in Fig. 1, the user needs to send b′3
to the second, third, and fourth storage nodes so that they can update b3, b1 + b3, and b2 + b3,
respectively.
To update the security metadata, the user first needs to learn the tag of bj , which can be done
as follows. Assume bj =
∑m
i=1 αi ei, then tbj =
∑m
i=1 αi tei . For i 6= 0, the user can download
tei from the appropriate storage nodes to compute tbj . The user then computes the tag tb′j of
b′j under key kv using Mac. Finally, it sends the difference between tb′j and tbj : δj = tb′j − tbj ,
to the TPA.
Subsequently, whenever challenging a storage node and obtaining a response block which
involves αj bj , the TPA runs VerifyProof with the tag t+αjδj instead of t. To see why this is the
case, let eˆ = αj bˆj+
∑
i=1,··· ,M ;i 6=j αi bˆi be the aggregated response block (before encryption). Its
corresponding tag that is sent back with the proof of possession is t = αj tbj+
∑
i=1,··· ,M ;i 6=j αi tbi .
But since bj is now updated, the correct tag must be t′ = αj tb′j +
∑
i=1,··· ,M ;i 6=j αi tbi = t+αjδj .
36
Note that if eˆ is not updated correctly by the storage node then by the security guarantee of
SpaceMac, w.h.p. t′ is not a valid tag for e. Subsequent updates to this j-th block can be carried
out similarly.
This approach requires the TPA to store one field symbol δj for every updated source block bj ,
which is O(m). This space overhead is negligible and could be constant in practice as discussed
in Section VII-A. Finally, we assume that the storage nodes send back correct tags. If one wants
to consider a stronger threat model where the storage nodes may send back corrupted tags, then
there are two possible solutions: (i) modifying the auditing scheme to require the user to store
the source tags, tbj ; in this case, the additional client storage overhead is O(m) (still negligible);
or (ii) a traditional MAC scheme computed on the coding coefficient, aug(ei), and verification
tag, tei , can be used to protect the integrity of the tag.
Block Insert. Similar to [18], a block insert is implemented with a block append and a mapping.
In particular, the block is first appended to the system using Block Append above. Then the user
needs to keep a mapping of the index of the appended block to its appropriate position.
Block Delete. We assume that the number of blocks to be deleted is small relatively to the
file size. If a large portion of the file is to be deleted then it is best to rerun the Setup phase
of NC-Audit. Similar to [18], we consider deletion of a block as changing it to a special block.
Thus, deleting a block can be done as in the Block Update case.
